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Introduction 
 
 Recently the methodology of experimental economics has become a 
flourishing sub – discipline within experimental economics, attracting both practicing 
experimentalists and philosophers to the debate. This debate has resulted in an in-
depth examination of the assumptions and methods used by experimentalists. As 
experimental economics becomes more accepted as a method within economics then 
this examination becomes more important as we need to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of these methods.  
 One philosopher who has taken a keen interest in experimental economics and 
has been central to most debates on the subject is Francisco Guala. In a series of 
papers (Guala 1998, 1999, 2003, 2005b) and a book (Guala 2005a) he has put forward 
a view of experimental economics which, if accepted, would have serious 
repercussions on the way in which experiments are done and the way in which 
experiments are evaluated. This view places experiments as an intermediary between 
theoretical modelling and the external world where experiments do not “test” theories 
but instead act as filters, examining the applicability of models which can then be 
compared with evidence in the external world. Under this interpretation, experiments 
are nearer to models than to theory testing vehicles and so should be seen as methods 
by which economists can manipulate ideas rather than as empirical tests. 
 This view of experimentation is radical in that it “blunts” the edge of many of 
the claims made by experimentalists (c.f. Smith 1982, Plott 1991, Starmer 1999). If 
experiments cannot be used for testing then their results are of a secondary nature- 
they need to be further compared with external world evidence before they can be said 
to be empirically interesting. Experiments can be avoided altogether, even in areas 
where it is a practical possibility, if one has a sufficiently rich model. Under this view 
experimentation is simply a method of accumulating phenomena which may or may 
not be useful in the external world. 
  The aim of this paper is to critique this point of view and to demonstrate that it 
relies on too- sharp distinctions and a false picture of how experimentalists go about 
their work. However, the paper will also go deeper in analysing why applicability is a 
poor method and why the current beliefs of experimenters in what they are doing is 
far more useful than is characterised by Guala. In this critique we will not try to 
criticise all of his claims as this will take up far too much space (and indeed, many of 
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his claims are reasonable1). Instead we will look at particular claims which seem to be 
central to his characterisation of experimental economics. 
 
 
Preliminaries- Cartwright’s work 
 
 The first problem when discussing the issues is to distinguish Guala’s claims 
from other claims which have been made in the literature. In particular we wish to 
look at those philosophers who have put forward methodologies which have similar 
points to those put forward by Guala. This allows us to distinguish Guala’s novel 
contributions from that of other philosophers whose work is similar in some respects 
but varies widely in others.  
  In particular we will look at another philosopher of science who has published 
some work on experimental economics, namely, Nancy Cartwright. Superficially, her 
work “The Dappled World” (Cartwright 1999) seems similar to that of Guala’s but is 
different at many points. It will be shown that many of the critiques offered by 
Cartwright of the usual model of scientific methodology, while similar to some of 
those offered by Guala, differ in certain respects crucial to this paper. 
    Cartwright argues strongly against the idea that the aim of experimentation is 
to test “laws of nature” or even universal theories. In her view this is a metaphysical 
mistake as these so called “universal” theories are almost never universal. There are 
always exceptions to the rule and so theories only hold ceteris paribus. The only time 
laws can be said to hold are during experiments, which tend to have many factors 
deliberately controlled and so are heavily “shielded” from the external world. 
 Cartwright puts forward an alternative metaphysical picture- that of capacities. 
An entity in a theory has the capacity to do something if there is a tendency for an 
action to occur. So, for example, a magnet has the capacity to be attracted to a piece 
of iron. This is not universal because something could get in the way- a piece of 
copper could interpose itself for example. However the tendency to attract iron still 
exists. Capacities allow us to generalise across circumstances including those in the 
external world and those in experiments. 
                                                 
1 Indeed it is worth saying that I have little quarrel with the first six chapters of Guala’s 2005 book and 
I think that much of what is said there is fair and reasonable. 
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 Regularities in the world are not the result of universal laws but are the result 
of “nomological machines” which link together in a system a variety of capacities and 
allow them to interact with each other. An experiment is set up as a special type of 
nomological   machine which suppresses certain capacities and allows others to 
operate without hindrance. Generalisations emerge from the bottom up as a result of a 
particular network of capacities being replicated in different contexts. This means that 
a regularity in an experiment can be isolated across a series of experiments and 
gradually generalised as it is shown to operate with differing systems. 
 In economics models therefore are designs of appropriate types of 
nomological machine. However, because of the large number of factors involved in 
economics, regularities tend to be few and far between. In a similar ways to physics, 
some of these regularities can be highlighted in experiments but, in general, 
economists, as with physicists, tend to work with models and experiments tend to be 
constructed to test these models. Some mechanisms, such as demand, tend only to 
work within a wider system such as a market, so isolating this as a regularity, as 
opposed to within a model, in an experiment is not useful. Physics and economics are 
therefore similar because they tend to use models rather than general theories. 
 The idea that theory testing is a poor reflection of how science actually 
operates is reflected in work by Hacking (1983), Kincaid (1996 Ch. 3) and Morrison 
& Morgan (1999). In all of these cases it is demonstrated that discussion about 
theories and theory testing actually bears little resemblance to what scientists do. 
Instead scientists build models and then test these models against the external world. 
Models however also act as mediating instruments in that they act to represent how 
the world works and to allow the modeller to understand it. Models are often 
constructed using theories but they are not purely theory derived, instead deriving 
parts from disparate sources, including theories, but also empirical sources and even 
arbitrary modelling decisions. Significantly, models can also be used to represent the 
external world as well as representing theories.(Morrison & Morgan 1999). This 
means that they provide a functioning “mini- world” including the main known causes 
and effects. 
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Guala’s ideas 
 
 Guala’s work is primarily associated with experiments in economics rather 
than other sciences so one of the first distinctions he makes is designed to explain 
why these experiments are different from those in physics. He uses a claim made by 
Hacking about laboratory sciences that they are “those whose claims to truth answer 
primarily to work done in the laboratory” (1992). Guala then defines a “Non- 
laboratory science” as one whose claims to truth do not and cannot answer primarily 
to work done in the laboratory because the aim is to explain and control non-
laboratory phenomena (Guala 1998, 2005a p.209).  
 Guala therefore sees a fundamental difference between laboratory sciences 
such as physics and non-laboratory sciences such as economics. In physics (as well as 
chemistry and biology), one is dealing with idealised circumstances where the entities 
controlled are often unnaturally pure and are often heavily shielded from the external 
world. Of course this “shielding” exists in economics experiments but in physics it 
doesn’t matter as most theories are concerned with the pure entities and the unnatural 
environments anyway. The theories in physics answer primarily to the evidence 
gathered in experiments and when one does experiments one is dealing with one’s 
target phenomena. 
 However, in economics this is not true. Economic theory, according to Guala 
(1999), is dependent on the institutional background or context in which the theory is 
supposed to be applicable. Economic theory is specifically constructed for this 
environment rather than to be tested in experiments. Because of this the argument that 
one can test a theory in an economics experiment becomes dubious, even though it is 
legitimate in a physics experiment. One cannot hope to have the same context in the 
laboratory as one has in the external world. 
It may be argued that it may still be possible to test an economic theory in the 
laboratory if one has sufficient causal factors represented in one’s theory for one to be 
able to test them. In other words, if one was able to completely specify the ceteris 
paribus clauses for the model being tested then such a test would be legitimate. This 
Guala (2005b, 2005a p. 150-156) refers to as the necessity for “completeness”. 
However completeness is a very difficult thing to achieve as it requires that in all 
experimental conditions there should be no unaccounted confounding factors. If such 
a factor is found then the theory is no longer complete. 
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This problem grows when one realises that completeness does not just apply to 
economic factors. In fact, many ceteris paribus clauses/ confounding factors in 
economic experiments will originate outside the domain of economics. Even worse, 
economic relations tend to supervene on other more fundamental relationships (for 
example in psychology). Moreover, the confounding factors which emerge from 
outside the domain of economics will tend to originate in these lower, more 
fundamental levels. It follows that completeness requires reduction to those more 
fundamental laws and an accounting of the possible confounding factors found at this 
level. However, these fundamental laws in turn supervene on more fundamental laws 
(say in physiology) and work only with respect to confounding factors and ceteris 
paribus clauses originating from this more fundamental level. This leads to a chain of 
reduction all the way down to physics which, according to Guala, is genuinely 
universal. 
Since reductionism is, at least practically, impossible and because the 
specification of all possible areas of applicability of a theory is not feasible, the 
requirement of completeness is far too onerous a condition for an economic theory. In 
fact, according to Guala, this impossibility is acknowledged in economic theories by 
an implicit ceteris paribus clause that effectively accounts for such confounding 
factors but does not explicitly state what they are. 
For this reason, there is no hard definition of the domain of applicability for a 
theory and so it is impossible to specify the conditions for an experiment to replicate 
that of the external world. Instead the link between an experiment and the external 
world is ensured empirically by the use of an analogy. A comparison has to be made 
between the elements of the experiment and the elements of a field study to ensure 
that the experiment is representative of the external world. An experiment therefore 
cannot be said to be “externally valid” unless it corresponds with some data from the 
external world. 
One implication of this view is that one cannot test external validity by 
bringing external factors into the laboratory as suggested by Starmer (1999) and Jones 
(2006). Any test carried out in the laboratory is a test of the robustness of a 
phenomenon under different conditions. (Guala 1999;2005a p. 228-229).  A test of 
robustness is a generic test of a phenomenon with different conditions. However it 
cannot be construed as a test of external validity because it does not, and cannot 
specify in enough detail the conditions for a given target system. To establish external 
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validity one needs to have a further hypothesis of a link between the experiment and 
the target system which can be confirmed or disconfirmed by an analogy. 
The question then arises as to what is the status of experiments in economics. 
It may seem from Guala’s analysis, stripped of its empirical role of testing theories, 
that the experiment’s role has changed. Guala endorses this change because, in his 
view, experiments are best seen as being similar to models in that they are used for 
demonstrating the effects of artificial systems. The main difference is that 
experiments have more concrete elements, such as real people as subjects. In this 
sense experiments are closer to the external world than are models. Models have a 
formal similarity with the external world, while experiments’ similarity is material as 
well. Of course, this does not mean that experiments are in any way more externally 
valid as both models and experiments abstract from the outside world. 
 
 
Specific Objections 
 
 It can be seen that Guala’s ideas do have some resemblance to those of 
Cartwright, particularly in his distrust for the role of theories and also because of his 
emphasis on ceteris paribus conditions and the fact that experiments are heavily 
shielded from the external world. However, while there are similarities it can be seen 
that there are substantial differences. Cartwright does not use the distinction between 
laboratory and non- laboratory sciences. As far as she is concerned there is no 
distinction between the two and the problems involved in one apply to the other as 
well. 
 Also, while Cartwright emphasises the necessity for ceteris paribus conditions 
on all theories and the impossibility of finding a “pure” universal theory, she does not 
take this to mean that one cannot do a test of the external world using the 
experimental method. Instead she sees this as evidence for a different metaphysical 
picture containing capacities and nomological machines rather than universal theories. 
Experiments in Cartwright’s view are simply controlled (or “shielded”) versions of 
the real world in which capacities are allowed to operate in their pure form. The 
shielding however does not mean that experiments are fundamentally different from 
what is happening in the external world.    
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 Given that Guala’s work is not necessarily supported by Cartwright’s ideas, do 
they stand up on their own merits? I would argue not, as Guala relies on a series of 
distinctions which are debatable. I will argue against his ideas on two levels. First of 
all, I will give specific reasons for why his general arguments do not stand up to 
scrutiny and then I will give more general arguments for why his methodology leads 
to a dead end for economics in general and economic experimentation in particular. 
 The first problem with Guala’s characterisation of economic experiments 
comes from his conceptual split between laboratory and non-laboratory sciences2. It is 
a crucial part of his conceptual schema because it allows him to split apart economic 
experiments from natural science experiments and to attribute problems to the former 
which do not exist in the latter. However it does not seem that this split is as sharp as 
Guala claims or has the implications he claims. 
 To see this we can look at a modern “fundamental science” such as 
cosmology. Cosmologists have devoted much time towards the study of the origins of 
the universe. In studying these events, the cosmologists have built models, they have 
used astronomical observations and they have used the results of particle accelerator 
experiments. This has resulted in a powerful mix of observation and theory to produce 
the highly sophisticated models in use today. It is not obvious that the cosmologists 
have used experiments as the sole target of their theory because they are using their 
theories to describe the universe as well while they obviously think that the results of 
particle physics experiments can be used in the external world without analogies to 
field studies. Experiments are being used, together with observation, as equally valid 
sources of evidence about the universe (see for example Hawley and Holcomb 1998). 
 A similar story could be told about evolutionary biology, where molecular 
biology, palaeontology, experimental evolution and ecological genetics combine to 
provide a widely varying differing variety of sources of evidence for various aspects 
of evolution. (see for example Stearns and Hoekstra 2000). The evidence produced in 
evolutionary experiments is not the sole target of theories but it is seen as being 
immediately relevant to the external world without the need for field evidence. 
 It seems that the “laboratory science” in Guala’s terms, while it may exist, is a 
rare thing indeed. This poses an awkward problem as it means that Guala’s critiques 
of laboratory work effectively apply to the “fundamental sciences” which he was 
                                                 
2 It should be emphasised that this split is of Guala’s own creation- Hacking (1992), whom he quotes 
for the definition of laboratory sciences, does not draw any philosophical implications from it. 
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trying to exclude. Therefore (using Guala’s methodology), if an experiment is done in 
a particle accelerator, the results can only be accepted as externally valid if similar 
effects are seen outside the accelerator, by observation in the field. This would tie 
down the scope of scientific research to an unacceptable level as many effects (as 
Hacking 1983 pointed out) cannot be seen in the external world3. 
 Another problem comes with the issue of ceteris paribus conditions. We have 
already seen how it is possible to accept Nancy Cartwright’s critique of conventional 
scientific theories and still maintain that experiments tell us something meaningful 
about the external world. This is because experiments are simply nomological 
machines which are constructed in the right way to produce effects without the ceteris 
paribus conditions. They do, however, contain the same capacities as the external 
world and we can derive knowledge about these capacities from experiments.  Guala 
however maintains that this is not the case and that the need to specify all of the 
conditions for applicability in effect means that the experiment is cut off from the 
world. In effect, any nomological machine constructed will always lack enough 
capacities to be a useful proxy for the external world. 
 However, this insistence on the necessity for specifying all possible conditions 
of applicability in order to test a theory (or just a Cartwright- style regularity) is 
strange. Guala himself (2005a) comments that this is not done by experimental 
economists and draws the conclusion that it is not done because it is not possible. 
However an alternative reading is that experimental economists try to control some 
possible confounding factors but not all. Instead of trying to control all possibilities 
experimentalists, like all scientists, try to control those factors which are relevant 
(Franklin 1986). As Franklin points out, while logically there are a vast number of 
possible factors there are usually, in practice, only a few which are strong enough for 
the experimenter to need to take notice.   
     Indeed, arguably, if we are to take Guala’s criterion seriously then the 
requirement to take account of all possible factors in a situation should be applied to 
all empirical research and not just experiments. Any kind of empirical, statistical 
relationship should explain as many factors as possible. An example of this can be 
seen in econometric studies of the labour market, where a whole series of factors may 
be put into a regression equation as variables as well as the ones which are predicted 
                                                 
3 Particularly in the case of particle physics since particles found in a particle accelerator can almost 
never be observed in a “free” state (Hawley and Holcomb 1998). 
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by a theory. Of course, these are not explicitly stated by the theory being tested and 
they are put in as a result of empirical knowledge of probable confounding factors 
from previous studies. However, these econometric studies do not include all possible 
confounding factors- a selection is always made from the infinite number of 
possibilities. 
 A similar attitude is emerging in economic experiments where the use of 
“experimetrics” (Camerer 2003) is becoming far more widespread. In addition the use 
of experiments with different treatments is used to test for different possible 
confounding factors. However, in all these cases there are no attempts to claim that all 
imaginable factors have been included while there is an attempt to include as many 
likely factors as possible. By contrast, if the effects on the main dependent variable 
are minimal then they will not be thought useful for the analysis4. 
It is also debatable as to whether causes of confounding factors/ ceteris paribus 
clauses outside the domain of economics have to be found in lower level sciences. 
According to Guala (2005a p. 153-156) this results in a chain of justification which 
goes all the way down to physics. However, this is not found in Fodor (1987), Guala’s 
source, who merely points out that explanations for some confounding factors have to 
be found in other sciences. While going down a level is the “most familiar” strategy, 
Fodor also suggests that it could be a science at the same level e.g. sociology. This is 
unexceptionable and does not lead to any necessity for reductionism if one is 
attempting to explain ceteris paribus clauses/ confounding factors. A desire for 
completeness or even a desire to include all relevant factors, does not rely on 
reductionism5. 
 Also dubious is the claim that economic models are only meaningful in the 
context of a given institutional background and that, since experiments do not have 
the correct institutional context, there is always going to be a problem in their external 
validity. This claim presumes that the simplification involved in creating experiments 
                                                 
4 One possible reason for the success of this method may be that the economic external world is in fact 
“modular” (Simon 1969) in that, while there are many “minor” causal linkages of low relevance 
between entities there are in fact very few major causal linkages. In artificial systems such as 
economies this occurs because of bounded rationality- humans inability to comprehend large, complex 
networks. This means that a researcher is relatively safe if she concentrates on the major causes of a 
phenomenon. 
5 Curiously, in a note (Guala 2005a p. 154) he states  “See also Kincaid (1996 Ch. 3) for a reductio ad 
absurdum of this sort”. While Kincaid does discuss the necessity (or otherwise) of reductionism in the 
social sciences he does not link it up with completeness and ceteris paribus conditions. 
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inevitably means that they are not the same as the target system6 and, as a result, need 
an analogy to transmit the findings across to the external world. 
 However, if experimentalists have included in their experiment those variables 
that are believed to be the most relevant to the particular situation then there is no 
reason why an experiment should not be seen as an empirical test in itself. If one 
follows Cartwright’s methodology, then an experiment is simply set up to test a 
regularity resulting from a nomological machine. If an experiment finds that 
regularity then it can be said to be directly testing the capacities of entities in the 
external world. An experiment is simply a “purified” nomological machine but the 
“shielding” does not make the experimental environment fundamentally different 
from that of the real world. (See also Hacking 1983) 
 The fact that there are a large number of factors which differ between an 
experiment and the external world should not, of itself, prevent an experiment being a 
vehicle for testing a phenomenon. Any empirical test of a phenomenon or a theory 
will involve data where there are differing factors between contexts. Where Guala 
recommends a “Field Study” for example (Guala 2005a p.219-221) when he talks 
about applicability of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in experiments to the external world, 
one can query whether applications to oligopoly or pollution are legitimate given the 
widely varying circumstances in these two cases. Given that they are assumed to be 
applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma then it could be argued that field studies on 
oligopoly or pollution could be used as tests of the Prisoner’s Dilemma model. 
  However, why should an experimental Prisoner’s Dilemma be different? Why 
can an experimental context not be used for such a test? In the former case it may be 
argued that oligopoly and pollution are modelled as prisoner’s dilemmas because the 
main aspects of the situation resemble a prisoner’s dilemma. However, exactly the 
same response can be made for an experimental version. Many details may vary but 
as long as the main relevant features are included, other factors need not be 
considered. 
  Guala makes a strict division between testing in the laboratory for robustness 
and testing for the generality of a phenomenon by using analogy to the external world. 
This follows from his beliefs that external validity can only be assured if there is an 
analogy to a specific, concrete target system and that experimenters cannot reproduce 
                                                 
6 This would be inconsistent with Morgan and Morrison’s (1999) claim that models can represent the 
outside world and can (in many cases) be moved closer to the outside world if necessary. 
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such a system in the laboratory because of the lack of “completeness” in any such test. 
However, in principle, it would seem that testing for confounding factors would be a 
prime method of making an experiment externally valid. 
  This can be seen by realising that the aim of experimentation is to test for 
causal relations. One is therefore searching for the causes of a behavioural pattern or 
some other effect. If an experiment does not correspond to the external world then this 
must be because its (relevant) causal relationships do not correspond. In principle 
therefore one could carry out a further experiment to ascertain whether this causal 
relationship holds or one could carry out more “experimetrics” on the current 
experiment. Since, as we have seen, the supply of relevant factors is usually not 
infinite, this is not an impossible task It follows therefore that possible confounding 
factors should be a motive for further tests rather than signs of an insuperable barrier. 
 A final criticism relates to Guala’s ideas on how external validity can be 
established, given that one cannot do it experimentally. Guala’s solution is that of 
analogy between the experimental system and the system in the external world. When 
a correspondence is established then so is external validity. This is admitted to be 
fallible but does not answer a question asked earlier: how general is this analogy? If 
one is testing a prisoner’s dilemma within one particular context in the external world 
then an analogy may be made between the experiment and this context. However, this 
is of little use. One needs to then form an analogy between this context and other 
contexts in the external world which have similar systems in order to establish a 
general relationship. Each of them will be different from each other and can only be 
made approximately the same by abstracting away from the context. Given that 
experimentation involves a similar process of abstraction, this leads to the same 
problem of why the experiment is the only context which is not seen as a valid 
testing- ground of the theory. 
 Even if we ignore this problem, then the proposed analogical relationship is 
still problematic. It begs the question of how we can tell whether an analogical test 
has been successful. Guala claims that this occurs when the relevant mechanisms can 
be mapped onto each other. However, this seems to contradict his claim that 
completeness is necessary for a test in the laboratory. Surely the “relevant 
mechanisms” would include the background context as well? Why are the relevant 
mechanisms sufficient for an analogical comparison with the external world but not 
for a full- blown test of the model?  
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 General Objections 
 
  Guala argues (p. 157 in Guala 2005a, p. 192 in Guala 2005b) that his 
methodology is not the same as mere instrumentalism (such as that of Friedman 
1953), partly because he imposes an inductive constraint whereby any redrawing of 
the boundaries of the domain of applicability of a theory must have testable 
implications. However this still leaves the notion of applicability open to several 
general worries. The primary claim is that, since the applicability conditions cannot be 
fully specified, one cannot be claiming to test a theory or model at all but can only 
demonstrate the circumstances under which a model can hold (Guala 2005b).  
 One problem with this picture is that it seems to have a confused view of the 
role of regularities in scientific experiments. The notion of applicability suggests that 
an experiment’s role is to test for applicability in different circumstances. However, 
suppose that we do such a test and find that a given model’s predictions do not hold 
i.e. it is not applicable. How far do such a test’s results hold? How different do 
circumstances have to be for the results not to hold? The point is that to extend this 
negative result beyond the immediate experimental test involves positing another 
regularity. In this case the regularity is the negative result attached to the model’s 
prediction in the circumstances of the test. 
   To use an example used by Guala: Chu & Chu (1990) demonstrated that 
arbitrage in an experiment can result in the preference reversal phenomenon being 
considerably reduced. This is obviously a counter- example to the generality of the 
preference reversal phenomenon. However can we apply it to all situations where 
there is arbitrage? Can we apply it even to identical experiments with arbitrage? In 
order to do so we would have to posit a regularity: “Preference reversal is reduced in 
the presence of arbitrage”. 
  However, this regularity in turn would require testing for applicability and the 
resulting regularities would require testing for applicability and so on ad infinitum. 
Under the applicability methodology one has to accept that a regularity will never be 
universal and so one becomes trapped in a vicious circle. It may be the case that these 
new regularities are testable but this does not release one from the vicious circle. If 
one abandons the idea that theories or models can be rejected by an experiment then 
one is left changing the domain of the regularity in response to every negative test. 
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Models increasingly become arbitrary collections of regularities with lists of 
exceptions. Models (and indeed the regularities created by the tests) lose value even 
according to the limited role of organising one’s ideas. If models are never rejected 
then there is no incentive to find a better model. 
 It should be noted that this problem does not apply to Cartwright’s (1999) 
methodology. Cartwright still allows for the testing of regularities within experiments 
as experiments in her view are heavily shielded “nomological machines” which are 
set up to generate such regularities. The testing of these regularities in turn indirectly 
tests the capacities of the components of the system. If the nomological machines fail 
to produce the regularities specified by the supposed capacities then this gives a signal 
that the proposed capacities or the design of the nomological machine is incorrectly 
specified.  
 The result of Guala’s methodology is that models (together with their list of 
confounding factors) will become more complex while the domain of applicability is 
drawn with increasing numbers of exceptions. This runs against the most common 
requirement for scientific modelling- that explanations should be parsimonious. An 
experimentalist using a methodology of applicability may start with a parsimonious 
explanation for the data but this will degenerate as more applicability exceptions pile 
up. Of course one can find out why there is such an exception as a low level 
hypothesis (as Guala suggests) but unless one creates a new, parsimonious model 
which allows for such exceptions7 then one is still left with the same problem. 
 Finally, even Guala’s inductive criterion for allowing exceptions falls foul of 
the applicability methodology he espouses. By requiring that any posited exception to 
a model must require a testable hypothesis, Guala quite rightly limits the scope for 
general refutations of specific experiments or of experimentation in general. However, 
by allowing for the possibility that this hypothesis in turn may be inapplicable, Guala 
effectively reduces the impact of this proposal. If such a hypothesis need not apply 
everywhere and any possible situation may be an exception then it need not apply 
anywhere except in the experiment where it was first proposed. This means, at the 
limit, one can suggest an exception to the rule without any necessity for this exception 
to hold in a future experiment. Ad hoc explanations of anomalous experimental 
results would become perfectly valid.  
                                                 
7 Of course, if the exception was integrated into a new, parsimonious model then it would no longer be 
an exception. 
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Conclusions 
 
 From this one could legitimately ask why this matters to experimentalists. Part 
of the reason is because of its implications for the status of experiments. If Guala is 
right and experiments are merely types of models with a small dash of realism then 
this demotes experimentation from being an empirical technique to being a subsidiary 
type of theorising. Experiments can no longer give final answers to essential questions 
about how the economy operates but instead have to wait for data generated by 
systems in the economy. Experiments therefore are stuck as intermediaries in the 
process of assessing the truth of models. 
 Even worse for experimentalists, large classes of experiments, those that do 
not have analogous counterparts in the external world, would have little influence on 
the content of economic science (Jones 2006 deals with such experiments at length). 
Such experiments would not act as intermediaries but simply as subsidiaries- waiting 
for a proper intermediary type experiment to incorporate its insights.  
 There are also severe problems for experiments if one accepts the idea that the 
main function of experiments (and indeed all types of empirical work) is to draw the 
boundary lines of the domain of applicability of a model or theory. The result would 
be a weakening of the interaction between experiments and theorising. Finding 
“applicability” is not the same as finding out why a theory or model has gone wrong. 
It does not allow for a search for explanation and, ultimately, a revision of the theory. 
  This means that one must ask serious questions about the point of 
experimentation under Guala’s characterisation. If experiments do not test models or 
theories but simply act as a peculiar type of model then why should one undertake the 
time and cost of carrying them out in the first place? Guala claims that experiments 
are worth doing because they include elements- such as real people- which are 
excluded from mathematical models and simulations. However, this doesn’t seem 
sufficient. According to his methodology this does not (and cannot) make the 
experiments more externally valid so the use of “real people” doesn’t have an impact 
on that level. 
 One could argue (as Guala seems to do) that experiments produce phenomena 
that the modellers have failed to think up. However, this is a critique of modeller’s 
imagination, as it is hard to see why a sufficiently imaginative modeller would not be 
able to incorporate such phenomena into his models without using experiments. Even 
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if one accepts experiments as idea-sources then there is still no need to do 
experiments- one could get one’s ideas from the vast amount of research done in 
psychology. 
Guala’s characterisation of economic experiments therefore would weaken the 
argument for carrying them out in the first place. However, as this paper has argued, 
there is no need to accept this characterisation. His arguments relating to external 
validity, in particular, are critically flawed. It follows that the rejection, made in this 
paper, of this type of argument restores experimentation as an empirical technique 
that has the power to force changes in theories (or models). We can also carry out 
experiments which investigate phenomena independently of theories/models and still 
be confident that we are saying something meaningful about the external world.  It 
does not mean that we have to accept the metaphysics of theories, the dogma of 
“crucial experiments” or ignore the problem of external validity. One can admit that 
these are wrong- headed positions and still reject Guala’s version of experimentation.  
 This is not to say that there are no correct points in Guala’s methodology. The 
closeness of models to experiments has been remarked on by Uskali Mali (2005) 
amongst others and in their construction there are obvious similarities. His distrust of 
theory- testing as the primary aim of experiments is, in my view, probably correct. 
Likewise for his emphasis on the value of surprising phenomena in experiments and 
his emphasis on the idea that experiments test causal relationships. There are many 
other ideas, particularly in his book, which are valid comments on experimental 
economics. This paper simply aims to challenge those parts which do not go through. 
 Finally, once one eliminates the distinction between experimental and non-
experimental sciences as a meaningful philosophical division then it can be seen that 
there is a general unity amongst experimental techniques. Economics experiments, 
while difficult and involving many factors, including human intelligence, not tackled 
in other sciences, are using essentially the same techniques. From this point of view 
there is no fundamental difference between the experimental sciences and economics 
can happily take its place amongst them.   
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